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1.1 Topic and issues 
In this thesis I will discuss joint bidding in public procurement tenders from a competition 
law perspective. The term joint bidding describes the situation where two or more economic 
operators come together and submit a joint bid for the award of a contract in a public 
procurement procedure.1 This can take form of an ad-hoc collaboration for a specific contract, 
or as an established consortium.2 My aim is to clarify how joint bidding in public tenders is 
assessed from a competition perspective. 
Combining public procurement and competition rules raises plenty of issues, but the main 
question raised in this particular thesis will be how joint bidding should be assessed under Art 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU)  and its 
equivalent Art. 53(1) of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereafter EEA). 
This again opens up for a lot of sub questions, but the main focus will be the assessment of 
joint bidding as a possible object restriction. Is joint bidding always a restriction by object?  
How should the assessment of a joint bidding arrangement as a possible object restriction be 
carried out? Should joint bidding be treated as price-fixing? How to decide if the undertakings 
submitting a joint bid are actual or potential competitors? These are the main questions I will 
assess and give my opinion on. 
When analyzing these research questions, I will focus on the nature of joint bidding 
agreements and the particularities this raises for competition law scrutiny, how joint bidding 
agreements and the procurement rules fostering them affect how the competitive assessment 
is to be made, and why these particularities and the reconciliation between the two areas of 
law should be taken seriously by tenderers, contracting authorities and competition enforcers 
alike when applying competition law. 
                                                 
1 See THOMAS (2015). RITTER (2017) uses the term joint tendering. SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015) uses both 
joint bidding and bidding consortia. 
2 In a Danish case, Dansk Vejmarkerings Konsortium, Decision of the Competition Council of 24 June 2015, the 
undertakings created a consortium agreement with the purpose to bid jointly. In the Swedish case Däckia 
Aktiebolag og euromaster Aktiebolag, Stockholms Tingrätt 21 January 2014, the undertakings created a one-off 
collaboration. In Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16 the 




1.2 Motivation  
There has only been one case within the EEA/EU jurisdiction regarding joint bidding and the 
application of Art. 101 TFEU or Art. 53 EEA.3 The lack of substantive case law on this matter 
makes the topic highly relevant to discuss from an academic perspective. Not only because 
there are issues yet to be discussed, which were not addressed by the EFTA Court, but also 
because the issues actually addressed and the arguments of the Court also must be reviewed 
and discussed in depth in order to assess whether the result is adequate.4 With the case being 
before the EFTA Court, it also remains to be seen if the ECJ will take on the same approach.5  
This lack of relevant EU/EEA case law also leads to a lack of legal certainty for the 
undertakings considering to bid jointly for public contracts. The issues under scrutiny in this 
thesis are of practical significance, by if not providing the perfect solution, then at least 
highlighting issues requiring awareness from the undertakings. 
In addition to a need of legal certainty and awareness, the issues are also of interest when 
looking to the worth of the procurement market. In 2017, the Norwegian public sector bought 
goods and services for 523 billion NOK.6 From 2013 to 2017, the market has grown 19% in 
total.7 Within the EU the total worth of the procurement market was nearly 2 trillion EUR, or 
13,4% of the Member States´ GDP in 2016.8 These numbers show why undertakings would 
(and should) participate in the procurement market; i.e.: there is profit to be made and 
competition to take place for such a large buyer. Engaging in joint bidding might be one way 
to try to enter it, a method becoming more and more important when looking to the trend of 
centralization in the procurement market.9 
 
                                                 
3 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16 
4 The case has already been subject to discussions. See SÁNCHEZ-GRAELLS (2017) and HERRERA 
ANCHUSTEGUI (2017) 
5 ECJ has in earlier cases adopted a rule of reasoning set by the EFTA Court by referring to the opinion in its 
own judgment in Judgment of 23 September 2003, Commission v Denmark, C-192/01, EU:C:2003:492 and 
Judgment of 9 September 2003, Monsanto Agricoltura, C-236/01, EU:C:2003:431. The case for the EFTA Court 
was the Kellogg´s case, Judgment of 5 April 2001, Kellogg´s, E-3/00. 
6 Numbers published by Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 20 December 2018. Available at https://www.ssb.no/offentlig-
sektor/statistikker/offinnkj  
7 Ibid 
8 KUTLINA-DIMITROVA (2018: 1) 




In this subsection I will describe how I resort to the application of legal method to my thesis. 
A preliminary remark is that this assessment is of the state of the law concerning joint bidding 
as it is unclear. Thus, my thesis is an analytical study of de lege lata. In this section I will 
discuss the legal sources, forms of interpretation and the relationship between EU competition 
law and public procurement law.  
1.3.1 Legal sources  
The main legal sources used in this thesis will be Art. 101 TFEU and its equivalent Art. 53 
EEA together with Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
public procurement (hereafter Directive 2014/24) on public procurement and relevant case 
law from the EU Courts and the EFTA Court. As some of the issues with joint bidding and 
competition law only have been discussed in one case for the EFTA Court, the thesis requires 
assessment of case law regarding Art. 101 TFEU in general to assess whether established 
rules are directly applicable to the joint bidding scheme or if there is a need of adjustments.  
In this thesis I will also include Norwegian legislation and cases handled by the Norwegian 
Competition Authority. As an EEA state, both the legislator and the competition authority are 
obligated to comply with EEA law. Although national practice has no legal effect on EEA 
law, cases may provide useful argumentation for discussions on the matter. 
I will also look to different sets of relevant soft law instruments, mainly guidelines published 
by the EU Commission and various national competition authorities within the EU. These 
instruments have special relevance for this thesis because of the value they have, even if they 
are soft law as I will discuss below but, more importantly, as this thesis deals with issues not 
yet ruled on by the EU Courts, such as the question on whether joint bidding is price-fixing. 
With their influence, it must be assessed if the guidelines are based on sufficient grounds, or if 
there is room for criticism and improvement based on how I believe competition law should 




Both the Danish Competition Authority and the Irish Competition and Consumer Commission 
have published guidelines on this topic as well.10 These guidelines aim to assist undertakings 
assessing their conduct of business with regards to the compatibility of a co-operative 
agreement with Art. 101 TFEU, and indicate how the different authorities intend to use their 
powers. As soft law instruments they are not legally binding, but both the EU Courts and the 
EFTA Court may refer to the guidelines published by the Commission in its Opinions and 
Judgements.11 With regard to the Commission´s Guidelines, they are not only legally binding 
for the Commission itself but also guide their approach and case priority.12 Held together with 
the Courts´ practice, this gives the guidelines a certain legal weight after all and speaks about 
their relevance. Furthermore, their relevance is closely connected to the topic of this thesis as 
to how different authorities look at matters discussed in the thesis.  
1.3.2 Interpretation  
The sources used in this thesis are a combination of primary and secondary legislature from 
the EU/EEA, in addition to case law from the EU Courts and the EFTA Courts. Case law 
holds a prominent role in developing not only competition law but also public procurement 
law, the use of it in this thesis is therefore substantial. Due to this, it is necessary to present 
the legal method adopted within EU and EEA, and how the EEA Agreement and its 
application interacts with EU law.  
Both the EU Courts and the EFTA Court apply a teleological interpretation of the 
legislation.13 This method of interpretation is focused on applying law with the function and 
the purpose of the provision in question leading the way. In practice, the courts often look to 
the provision(s) underlying purpose to clarify its scope of application. If the underlying 
purpose implies a wider application of the provision than the wording alone suggests, the 
Court will apply the provision to the situation in line with its intended purpose and function. 
                                                 
10 Danish Guidelines available at: https://www.en.kfst.dk/media/50765/050718_joint-bidding-guidelines.pdf  
Irish Guidelines available at: https://www.ccpc.ie/business/help-for-business/guidelines-for-
business/consortium-bidding-guide/  
11 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16, para 97. For in depth 
discussions on soft law and its position in EU law in general, see SENDEN, L. Soft Law in European 
Community Law, 2004, Hart Publishing, Oxford. See also Judgment 13 December 2012, Expedia, C-226/11, 
EU:C:2012:795 were ECJ held that the Commission´s De Minimis Notice intended to give guidance to the 
Courts and authorities of the Member States.  
12 See Judgment of 28 June 2005, Dansk Rørindustri, C-189/02 P, EU:C:2005:408, para 211.  
13 The case of Dassonville is a clear example of a dynamic interpretation of EU law, see Judgment of 11 July 
1974, Dassonville, C-8/74, EU:C:1974:82, para 5. 
 
 
The EFTA Court´s application of the teleological method is best explained by reference to the 
principle of homogeneity.14 The purpose of the agreement is to bring the EEA EFTA states 
and the EU Member States together in the internal market.15 In order to create a functional 
market, the agreement imposes equal rights and obligations for both individuals and economic 
operators within the EEA. Common rules dictate both harmonized application and scope, and 
according to Art. 6 of the EEA Agreement any interpretation of the agreement must be done 
in conformity with EU law. This includes relevant case law by ECJ prior to the birth of the 
EEA agreement.16 
Although there is no legal obligation under international law to do so17, the EFTA Court also 
follows rulings given after the signing of the agreement.18 To ensure homogeneity in the 
development of EU and EEA law, also later case law is referred to by the EFTA Court when 
facing questions of interpretation and applicability.19 Therefore, this thesis will not draw a 
line between case law from the EU Courts prior to and after the signing of the EEA 
Agreement. 
1.3.3 The relationship between EU/EEA Competition and Public 
Procurement Law 
This thesis is a study of Competition and Public Procurement Law and how these rules 
interact in the case of joint bidding. These are two different set of rules that are interrelated, 
and both of them are EU and EEA law. The relevant part of competition law to discuss in this 
thesis is Art. 101 TFEU, and its EEA equivalent, Art. 53. This is a part of EU primary law20. 
The rules of public procurement consist of several pieces of secondary legislature.21 Primary 
                                                 
14 See Art. 1 EEA where the aim of creating a homogeneous EEA is mentioned. The principle also shines 
through in recital 4. In Recital 16 the objective to arrive and maintain a uniform interpretation and application of 
the EEA agreement where it mirrors EU law is explicitly stated. See also FREDRIKSEN (2015: 183-189) for an 
in-depth discussion of the EFTA Court´s approach on the case law from ECJ. 
15 The EFTA Secretariat,  The European Free Trade Association, accessed 17 April 2019, 
https://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association  
16 As held in Art. 3(1) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement the EFTA Court´s obligation lies with case law 
given prior to the date of signature. 
17 Art. 6 EEA and Art. 3(1) of the Surveillance and Court Agreement clearly states that the obligation only 
encompass case law given prior to signing. 
18 See for instance Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16 
19  See SEJERSTED et al. (2014: 223-224) and ROGNSTAD (2001: 448-449) for discussions on the principle of 
homogeneity, and how the aim affects the EFTA Court´s approach to case law from ECJ. 
20 The Treaties are EU primary law, see statement from the EU Commission on Types of EU law, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/types-eu-law_en accessed 30.04.2019 





law is the basis for all EU actions and legislation, meaning that any legal act deriving from 
primary law must comply with it.22 Thus the rules on public procurement are subordinate to 
Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA, meaning that the rules on joint bidding deriving from EU 
secondary law cannot be in breach with Art. 101 TFEU or Art. 53 EEA. This sets a frame for 
the further assessment. 
 
1.4 Outline of the study 
I have structured this thesis as follows. Firstly, the concept, rationale and modalities of joint 
bidding will be analysed. This will be followed by the reconciliation of joint bidding and 
competition law. Thereafter, I will discuss the condition of actual or potential competitors is 
discussed, both what the legal test is and how the assessment should be carried out. In the 
following section I will discuss joint bidding as an object restriction and how the assessment 
should be carried out. Lastly,  I will discuss the EFTA Courts Opinion in the Ski Follo case, 
whether joint bidding constitutes price-fixing and the potential consequences thereof. 
1.5 Limitations  
I will not deal with the scrutiny of joint bidding as a possible restriction by effect, nor will I 
go into details on the application of Art. 101(3) TFEU and Art. 53(3) EEA. Furthermore I will 
not discuss the scope of application in terms of whether the EU Courts or the EFTA Court 
have jurisdiction. Regarding limitations in time, the legal analysis is conducted until 30 April. 
 
                                                 
22 The Treaties are EU primary law, see statement from the EU Commission on Types of EU law, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/types-eu-law_en accessed 30.04.2019  
 
 
2 Joint bidding in Public Procurement 
2.1 Rationale of joint bidding 
Call for tenders in public procurement are organized to create competition for the public 
contract, so that the public buyer is able to acquire goods, works or services to carry out its 
public functions.23 This is based on the idea of competition resulting in better value for the 
public funding spent on the contract, as well as a way to limit public authorities discretion and 
ensure a transparent market and equal treatment of potential sellers.24  
In this setting, joint bidding is potentially beneficial to both the buyer and the economic 
operators, one example being where a public contract requires different areas of expertise. If 
so, undertakings with different areas of expertise can collaborate in order to deliver what the 
buyer is looking for. The possibility to bid jointly can also increase the competition for a 
contract in different ways, one way being that it opens up for economic operators25 coming 
together where they individually might not meet the requirements stated in the selection 
criteria26, or when a potential bid could be made more attractive due to pooling of resources 
and creation of economy of scale on the producer side. 
In this setting, joint bidding allows for small medium enterprises (SME) to access the 
procurement market in cases where the contract is of such a size, that a single SME is not able 
to meet the stated requirements, leaving them without access to the procurement market.  
In contrast to SME participation and joint tendering, the trend in the procurement market the 
recent years is centralization of procurement through establishment of centralized purchasing 
bureaus.27 The bureaus conduct procurements on behalf of multiple buyers. This allows for 
                                                 
23 SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: 11) 
24 SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: 11) See Directive 2014/24 recital (1) and (2) for the principles and goals of 
public procurement. 
25 The legal term for undertakings participating in public procurement procedures, legal definition given in Art. 2 
1.(10) of Directive 24/2014 
26 Art. 58 in Directive 2014/24 regulates selection criteria. These are minimum requirements the tenderers have 
to comply with in order to compete for the award of the contract 
27 Centralized purchasing is regulation in Art. 37 of Directive 2014/24. See also recital 69 for more the 
development and the underlying rationale of centralization. In Norway, the government established Statens 
Innkjøpssenter in 2016, a bureau who enters into and manage procurement agreements on behalf of all public 
bodies under state control. A similar bureau was established by law in Sweden in 1998 (Förordning om 
(1998:796) om statlig inköpssamordning). The topic and trend is covered in articles by HERRERA 




bigger contracts, resulting in large undertakings being the only ones able to deliver at the 
requested scale.28 The result is a procurement market dominated by buyer power and 
undertakings with market power.29 This trend is making it more difficult for SMEs to access 
the procurement market. Yet, this could also create greater opportunities for SMEs to bid and 
win contracts if done through collaboration, and if this modality is allowed by contracting 
authorities and resorted to by economic operators. The result will be improved market access, 
increased business sales, security for jobs and economic growth.  
SMEs taking part in the public procurement might also benefit the buyer in a different way 
than large bidders. SMEs might be more adaptive and innovative, in contrast to large bidders 
where the chance is that the buyer is only offered standardized services or goods due to 
economy of scale which allows for a lower price. Ensuring that the SMEs can take part in the 
public market is of great interest also for the buyer to increase the chances of getting a 
bespoke service. Joint bidding thus allows for greater innovation and consistency, and opens 
up the procurement procedure to more competition.30 Allowing two or more SMEs to 
collaborate through joint bidding will in such a case result in more tenderers for the award of 
a contract, and thus greater competition.31 
2.2 Regulation of joint bidding in Directive 2014/24 
Joint bidding is allowed under the EU and EEA rules on public procurement, as incorporated 
in Art. 19(2) of Directive 2014/24.32 Article 19(2) expressly states that “groups of economic 
operators (…) may participate in procurement procedures”. There is no form requirement for 
the legal personality of the collaboration in order to submit a tender or a request to participate.  
According to paragraph two of Art. 19(2), the buyer may clarify in the procurement 
documents  how the undertakings wanting to bid jointly are to meet the requirements stated in 
                                                 
28 For in-depth discussion on the benefits as well as the concerns of centralized purchasing, see HERRERA 
ANCHUSTEGUI (2015) 
29 Discussion on buyer power, SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS and HERRERA ANCHUSTEGUI (2016: 3) See also page 
9 and 10 for discussion on how centralization may lead to market concentration and squeezing of SMEs. 
30 Irish Consumer and Competition Protection, Consortium Bidding, page 5 para 1.13 and 1.14, where the 
authority argue that exclusion of SMEs might mean exclusion of small firms and new entrants with innovative 
solutions. Joint bidding is a way to hinder this, and at the same time pool knowledge and resources to deliver 
competitive offers on both quality and price. 
31 See Irish Consumer and Competition Protection, Consortium Bidding, page 5 para 1.14, where it is argued that 
in long term an exclusion of SMEs may not only decrease competition and increase prices, but also hinder new 
entrants and even limit the number of firms left in the market. 
32 Incorporated to the EEA agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee, No. 97/2016, 29 April 2016, OJ 
L 300, 16.11.2017, page 49. 
 
 
the selection criteria, where it is considered to be necessary. Such a clarification must be 
justified by objective reasons, and be proportionate. The EU and EEA States may establish 
standard terms for how collaborations are to meet those requirements. 
Furthermore, it follows from paragraph three of Art. 19(2) that in case of imposing different 
conditions for the performance of a contract on the collaboration than on individual 
participants, the conditions shall also be justified by objective reasons and be proportionate. 
The Directive provides no further rules on how joint bidding should be treated by the EU and 
EEA States. The provision only imposes a duty on the EU and EEA States to make sure that 
national procurement rules allow for groups of undertakings to submit a joint bid or a request 
to participate in the procurement process, together with a possibility to establish standard 
terms.33 With a demand of the terms being both justified by objective reasons and 
proportionate, the Directive highlights that any further regulation needs to comply with the 
general principles of TFEU and other requirements deriving from EU law, such as equal 
treatment, non-discrimination, transparency and competition. The Directive provides 
minimum rights for undertakings to participate, making it a breach of EU/EEA law if the 
States do not open up national legislature for allowing joint bidding. The regulation must be 
seen in the light of EU´s wish to facilitate for participation of SMEs in public procurement, as 
stated in recital 2 of the Directive. 
As remarked before, Art. 19(2) does not require the cooperation between the economic 
operators to take on any specific form when placing bids. In practice, this means that joint 
bidding can take the form of two different economic operators choosing to cooperate for the 
specific contract, or the situation where you have an established consortium.34 In case of loose 
groups coming together for the specific contract, the Contracting Authority (CA)35 may 
impose an obligation to take on a specific legal form once they have been awarded the 
contract;36 recital 15 gives examples on when this might be necessary, for instance where 
                                                 
33 See SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: 339) for discussion on how the Member States should regulate bidding 
consortia 
34 See Judgment of 23 January 2003, Makedoniko Metro C-57/01 EU:C:2003:47 as an example on established 
consortia participating in public procurements. This was also the situation in a decision by the Italian 
competition authority, regarding collection of slum in Lombardy and Piemonte. Decision no. 25302 of February 
3th 2015, later confirmed by Consiglio di Stato (the high court of Italy). Also Judgment of 22 December 2016, 
Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16, where the undertakings submitting a joint bid had established a 
joint venture prior to the submission of bids. An example of a loose form of collaboration is the case of EL-
Proffen, were several electricity companies decided to submit a joint bid for a framework agreement. A decision 
made by the Norwegian competition authority, V2017-21 of 4 September 2017. 
35 The term Contracting Authority is given a legal definition in Art. 2.1.(1) of Directive 2014/24 




joint and several liability is required. The point is, however, that this right to impose duties on 
taking on a legal form only arises after the contract is awarded. During the procurement 
process, the CA only has the option to clarify how economic operators are to meet the 
requirements laid out in the selection criteria. This eliminates concerns on whether or not 
SMEs have the necessary financial capacity to contract. With no obligation to take on a legal 
form when competing for the contract, this opens the procurement up to more competition 
and ensures equal treatment of potential bidders regardless of form. 
In the Norwegian legislature, Art. 19 (2) is incorporated through Forskrift om offentlige 
anskaffelser § 16-11. In § 16-11 it is expressly stated that the CA can only require the 
economic operators choosing to bid jointly to take on a specific legal form after the contract 
has been entered into, and only so far as necessary to ensure satisfying performance of the 
contract. At this point there is a slight difference, as the Norwegian implementation is a result 
of a directly opposed interpretation of the wording in Art. 19(2)37. However, the wording of 
§16-11 does show that the legislator has payed close attention to primary EEA and EU law 
such as the principle of equal treatment by including a condition of necessity. In practice, this 
form of interpretation and implementation is an effective way to ensure national legislation 
being in accordance with EEA law, because the provision is clear on when the CA can impose 
requirements.38 Aside from this, the provision mirrors the Directive´s Art. 19(2) in wording, 
and there are no differences regarding the scope of the provision. 
 
                                                 
37 The wording of Art. 19(2) first paragraph is that «(groups of economic operators) shall not be required by 
contracting authorities to have a specific legal form in order to submit a tender or a request to participate.» 
38 As opposed to the wording of Art. 19(2), which only says the CA shall not impose requirements in order to 
tender or submitting a request to participate.. 
 
 
3 Joint bidding and the problems with 
competition law 
3.1 Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA reconciled 
with Art. 19(2) of Directive 2014/24 
Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA prohibit agreements39 between undertakings 
considered to be competitors which have an anti-competitive object or effect, unless they can 
be justified under Art. 101(3) TFEU or Art. 53(3) EEA. As competition law does not provide 
special rules for the assessment of joint bidding40, is it important to determine if and when 
joint bidding agreements may be in breach of Art. 101(1) TFEU or Art. 53(1) EEA due to 
their object or effect. The rationale behind the provision is that restriction of competition 
through agreements between competitors is harmful to society.41 The provision applies to 
both horizontal and vertical agreements.42  
 
Joint bidding in itself constitutes an agreement between potentially or actually competing 
undertakings competing for a procurement contract.43 The agreement is horizontal, as the 
parties are potential competitors in the same segment of the market, as opposed to vertical 
agreements in which parties compete in different segments of the market.44 The agreement 
might be in writing or orally but, regardless of form, there is an expression of a joint intention 
to collaborate on a tender for a public procurement procedure. Thus, undertakings must pay 
attention to competition rules prior to entering into a joint bidding agreement or face 
competition law liability. The responsibility to comply with competition law lays with the 
undertakings themselves. Therefore, they have to assess whether a cooperative agreement 
                                                 
39 Case law from the EU court clearly shows that the form in which the joint intention is expressed is of less 
importance. See for instance Judgment of  8 July 1999, ANIC, C-49/92 P, EU:C:1999:356, para 108, where the 
court held that the only thing of importance is the distinction between independent conduct and collusion. And 
further, that an agreement typically is an expression, by the participating undertaking of their joint intention to 
conduct themselves on the market in a specific way. 
40 SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015: 338) See also section 1.3.3 
41 Distorted competition affects both the consumers and the other competitors. For in depth discussion on theory 
of competition and the function of competition law, see WISH and BAILEY (2018: 4-24) See also FOX and 
GERARD (2017: 35-40) for a discussion on the harmful effects of cartels. 
42 See WISH and BAILEY (2015: 82-156) for literature on Art. 101 TFEU in general.  
43 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16. Whether they are competitors 
are decided with regards to the specific tender in question. See section 3.2 





with (several) other undertakings is legal. This demands clear rules, leaving the undertakings 
able to plan their business strategy with full legal certainty.   
3.1.1 The issue and need of reconciliation 
Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA gives examples on agreements that are generally 
considered to restrict competition by object. Direct or indirect price-fixing is specifically cited 
as an example of an agreement restricting competition in the Treaties. In case law price-fixing 
is considered likely to have negative effects, so that it may be considered as a restriction by 
object.45  
 
In this perspective, applying Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53 (1) EEA in a strict and formalistic 
manner will leave little room for joint bidding as in most cases, the undertakings must agree 
on a price prior to submitting a bid. Art. 19(2) of Directive 2014/24 will be left without effect, 
meaning that joint bidding is allowed and encouraged under the rules of public procurement, 
but illegal under the rules of competition law. In practice, this leaves no room for tender 
collaboration. At the same time, there is no doubt that some agreements in the form of a joint 
bid could be in fact anti-competitive, and thus is breach of Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA.  
 
Related to the risk of facing competition law liability, it is also important for the undertakings 
to clarify the legal scope under Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA with regards to future 
procurement procedures. The questions arising from combining the rules on joint bidding and 
competition law is important beyond the contract in question. According to Art. 57(4)d) and 
c) of Directive 2014/24  infringements of competition law in general constitute an explicit 
cause of exclusion from future public procurement procedures.46 A breach of competition law 
might leave undertakings unable to take part in the procurement market for years, meaning 
that if the joint bid in question is illegal, the undertakings involved are excluded from the 
market. This could potentially have serious consequences for the involved parties. 
                                                 
45 See for example Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16, para 92, and 
Judgment of 4 June 2009, T-Mobile, C-8/08, EU:C:2009:343, para 43 as well as Judgment 14 March 2013, Del 
Monte, T-587/08, EU:T:2013:129, para 585. See also Guidance on restriction of competition “by object” for the 
purpose of defining which agreements may  benefit from the De Minimis Notice, C(2014) 4136/1. Published 
18.06.2014, where it is held that price-fixing agreements between competitors are a restriction by object. 
46 Exclusion grounds are discussed in depth by SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2015), and especially on page 296-301 
where previous breaches of competition law is discussed as grounds for exclusion of potential bidders 
 
 
Due to this, the material scope of Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA in the cases of joint 
bidding therefore needs to be assessed, to clarify when joint bidding and consortia is legal 
and when it is illegal from a competition law perspective.  
3.2 The requirement of the undertakings being 
competitors. 
3.2.1 The starting point 
For the joint bid to restrict competition, the undertakings collaborating have to be 
competitors.47 If they are not, the undertakings may cooperate in any desired way in the 
context of public procurement.48 Thus, it is important to clarify when the parties are 
competitors in the procurement context. 
 
In cases where the undertakings submitting a joint bid are not deemed to be competitors, the 
joint bid is not caught by Art. 101(1) TFEU or Art. 53(1) EEA. However, if the undertakings 
are collaborating through subcontracting this would still be caught by Art. 101 TFEU or Art. 
53 EEA. This is a vertical agreement, and differs from the situation of joint bidding where the 
undertakings have a horizontal agreement and will not be discussed further as it is outside the 
scope of my research.  
 
In Ski Follo, the EFTA Court held that only if the parties are actual or potential competitors, 
the submission of joint bid may be considered as a restriction of competition.49 This is in line 
with former case law from ECJ, and the Commission´s Guidelines.50 The main questions 
arising to be answered, is when are they considered to be competitors? And how to assess if 
they are or not?  How does the test apply to the joint bidding situation? 
 
                                                 
47 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16, para 97 
48 SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, Comments to Danish draft guidelines on joint tendering, How to crack a nut – a blog 
on EU economic law. Accessed 12.03.2019. Available at 
http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2017/7/7/0p5ahpp86745j76bemm6dflw6hwloz 
49 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16, para 94, See also WISH and 
BAILEY (2018: 135)  
50 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements OJ (2011) C 11/1 




In a normal market situation, Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA applies if the undertakings are 
active on the same market, and they produce or supply the same product or service. The 
decisive factor in relation to joint bidding is whether the undertakings are deemed to be 
competitors for the specific procurement contract.51 Why this difference in the procurement 
setting? The procurement market is demand-driven. The competition between undertakings 
on the market is limited to the competition for a specific contract, only then do the market 
itself and consequently competition arise. From this perspective, limiting the context to the 
procurement procedure gives a defined context and mirrors the nature of the market in my 
opinion.  
3.2.2 How to assess if the undertakings are competitors in relation 
to the procurement? 
Once the market context in which the parties are considered to be competitors when assessing 
joint bidding is established, the next question is when are they competitors, and how to assess 
if they are or not?  
 
In Ski Follo, the EFTA Court found it essential for the establishing of the joint bid as anti-
competitive that the parties could have tendered individually, meaning that the Court held the 
undertakings as competitors, since they would have been able to submit individual bids for 
the contract.52 However, the Court is not clear on how the assessment shall be carried out. 
And it is unclear if whether they are competitors should be determined on the basis of 
compliance with minimum requirements in the tender documents, or if the undertakings 
would have been likely to be awarded the contract.53 By using the word “able” there is a slight 
leaning against the compliance with minimum requirements, as they are decisive of the ability 
to contract. Also, there is no mentioning of being able to tender successfully. This could add 
to the notion of minimum requirements being decisive. However, other sources must be 
resorted to in order to answer the question with certainty.  
 
According to the Commission´s Guidelines on horizontal agreements a commercialisation 
agreement is normally not likely to give rise to competition concerns if it is “objectively 
                                                 
51 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16 para 98, See also RITTER 
(2017: 4) 
52 Judgment of 22 December 2016, Ski Taxi SA v Norwegian Government, E-3/16 para 98. 
53 Highlighted by HERRERA ANCHUSTEGUI (2017: 6) 
 
 
necessary” to allow one party to enter a market it could not have entered individually.54 In this 
context, the agreement to bid jointly must be necessary for the undertakings in order to enter 
the procurement market. This indicates that the assessment should be done with regard to the 
selection criteria, as opposed to the likelihood of contract award, as they are decisive for 
whether the undertakings are deemed fit to compete for the contract and thus gain market 
access.55 If drawing a parallel to the normal market, there is no requirement of undertakings 
having market shares to be considered as competitors. As long as they (can) operate within 
the same segment they are considered as competitors, because they have market access. If 
adopting this view to the procurement setting, this would create coherent rules. 
 
In the Guidelines published by the Danish Competition Authority, it is held that the 
undertakings are competitors if they individually can complete the contract.56 This means that 
the assessment is based on the concrete contract in question. However, it is not clear if the 
statement should be interpreted as the ability to meet the minimum requirements being 
decisive, or if what matters is ability to contract completion. The latter is a third alternative 
different from the likelihood of contract award. If complying with selection criteria the 
undertaking is supposed to be able to complete the contract in theory but this is not given. 
Thus, it would be difficult for both competition authorities and the undertakings to assess if 
they are competitors or not, because the assessment would be based on potential future 
scenarios. 
 
If the test is likelihood of contract award, this leads to the same conflict with the need of legal 
certainty and easily applicable rules. If assessing on the basis of ability to meet the selection 
criteria, this would create a rule more easily applicable by both competition authority, courts 
and the undertakings themselves when assessing whether they are competitors and thus in a 
position to bid jointly or not. It is a pure objective assessment were the undertakings capacity 
is held up against the specific selection criteria. In my opinion, this is the ideal solution.57 
 
                                                 
54 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal co-operation agreements OJ (2011) C 11/1 
para 237 
55 Art. 58(1) of Directive 24/2014 
56 Joint Bidding under Competition law - Guidelines published by the Danish Competition authority in 2018, 
available at https://www.en.kfst.dk/media/50765/050718_joint-bidding-guidelines.pdf page 10 




When assessing the ability to meet the minimum requirements, it is of relevance whether the 
tender documents give the possibility to submit bids for lots of the contract. When dividing a 
contract into lots, the buyer is free to decide the size and subject-matter of the different lots. 
In case of larger contracts, the division allows for more undertakings to compete for part(s) of 
the contract, thus the buyer opens up for greater competition.58 Division into lots is allowed 
according to Art. 46 of Directive 24/2014. If the buyer has divided the procurement into lots, 
the capacity to bid for one or more of these lots is decisive when determining if the 
undertakings are competitors.  
 
On these grounds, undertakings are actual competitors if they meet the selection criteria 
individually. This gives them the ability to tender alone. If the contract is divided into lots, the 
undertakings´ ability would be measured against the requirements for a single lot. 
Furthermore, the notion of potential competitors must be discussed, not only how the concept 
reconcile with the joint bidding scheme but also how an assessment of whether the 
undertakings are potential competitors should be carried out. 
3.2.3 The notion of “potential competitors” – is it applicable? 
According to the Commission´s Guidelines, commercialisation agreements are allowed if the 
agreements allow the companies involved to participate in projects that they would not be 
able to undertake individually.59 This statement can be interpreted in the following way; as 
long as the undertakings collaborating are not able to meet the requirements on their own, 
they cannot be regarded as competitors.60 Such an interpretations suggest that the notion of 
potential competition is not applicable when assessing commercialization agreements such as 
joint bidding arrangements. If so, joint bidding is allowed under the competition rules as long 
as the undertakings would not have been able to tender alone. Such an interpretation does not 
comply with Art. 101 TFEU and its case law. It is undisputed that agreements between 
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para 237 
60 SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, Comments to Danish draft guidelines on joint tendering, How to crack a nut – a blog 




potential competitors run the risk of being considered anti-competitive just as agreements 
between actual competitors, and this must also apply to joint bidding situations.61  
 
Yet, this is a discussion de lege feranda. By applying a narrow rule where joint bidding is 
allowed as long as the undertakings are not able to tender individually, this would lead to an 
objective rule easily applicable. The undertakings either have or do not have the ability to 
tender alone. Such a rule would also cause less problems when assessing whether the 
agreement could be defended under Art. 101(3) TFEU or Art. 53(3) EEA, due to the 
conditions of whether the undertakings could have reached the same efficiencies through less 
restrictive means. If so, the agreement cannot be defended under Art. 101(3) TFEU or Art. 53 
EEA. If this condition is to be understood as to include an assessment of potential alternative 
agreements with third parties as options being less restrictive competition wise62, then it will 
be (almost) impossible to defend it for undertakings being potential competitors, because an 
undertaking is always free to subcontract instead of entering into a joint bidding agreement.63 
A narrow rule would also enhance the legal incentive Art. 19(2) in Directive 2014/24 
represents due to legal certainty for the undertakings. Furthermore, it would eliminate the 
problem of second guessing business decisions by competition authorities.64 
 
Such a solution do have a backside. If joint bidding typically is illegal between actual 
competitors due to their ability to tender alone, this could open the market up for speculations. 
Actual competitors could allocate resources to different projects, in order to give the 
impression that they do not have the required capacity for the contract, to be able to collude 
with a competitor. If so, there is still competitive pressure between the undertakings but this is 
artificially removed for the purpose of the procurement contract. 
 
                                                 
61 The issue of potential competitor was not discussed by the EFTA Court in Ski Follo, because the undertakings 
were actual competitors. 
62 As put forth by RITTER (2017: 8) 
63 This potential issue has been discussed in depth by several professionals. See SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS (2017), 
as well as the blog post New analysis of joint tendering under EU competition law: a few comments on Ritter (20 
February 2017) How to crack a nut – a blog on EU economic law. Available at: 
http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2017/2/20/new-analysis-of-joint-tendering-under-eu-competition-law-
ritter-2017  Accessed 13.03.2019. See also RITTER (2017) and THOMAS (2015). A subcontracting agreement 
also run the risk of facing competition law liability, but this is outside the scope of my thesis 
64 It seems as if this view is argued for by SÁNCHEZ GRAELLS, New analysis of joint tendering under EU 
competition law: a few comments on Ritter (20 February 2017) How to crack a nut – a blog on EU economic 
law. Available at: http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2017/2/20/new-analysis-of-joint-tendering-under-eu-




Bearing in mind the possibility of speculation from undertakings, the positive sides from 
applying such a rule might outweigh the potential negatives, as it would contribute to more 
accurate decisions by competition authorities and the Commission, as well as effective 
enforcement of Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA. 
3.2.4 When are the undertakings potential competitors? 
There is substantive case law from the EU Courts regarding the term potential competitor in 
general.65 In Toshiba the parties to the agreement were not active in the same geographical 
market, and thus they had agreed to not enter into their respective markets. ECJ held that there 
was a potential competitive relationship between them, since there was no unconquerable 
barriers for the undertaking in Asia to enter the EEA market.66 The agreement was therefore 
found to restrict competition. In later case law the legal test applied is whether there are “real 
concrete possibilities” for the undertakings concerned to compete in the relevant market.67 
Also, the case law further shows that the assessment of those possibilities must be founded on 
evidence or an analysis of the market in question68 in the light of the ability and intention to 
enter the market, as well as the firm´s perception of another being a potential competitor.69  
 
Based on my conclusion in section 3.2.2, the assessment of whether there are real concrete 
possibilities must be measured against the minimum criteria when looking into whether the 
companies are potential undertakings. Thus, the relevant questions are; how far off are the 
undertakings from meeting the minimum criteria and thus having the ability to tender alone? 




                                                 
65 See also Judgment of 28 June 2016, Telefónica, T-216/13, EU:T:2016:369, paras. 201-227 
66 Judgment of 20 January 2016, Toshiba, C-373/14 P, EU:C:2016:26, para 36 
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restriction by object. Judgment of 28 June 2016, Telefónica, T-216/13, EU:T:2016:369, paras. 201-227. The 
same statement was also put forth in Judgment of 28 June 2016, Portugal Telecom, T-208/13, EU:T:2016:368, 
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69 See the General Courts decision in VISA, where intention «may be of relevance». Judgment of 14 April 2011, 
VISA, T-461/07 EU:T:2011:181, para 168 
 
 
3.2.5 How to carry out the assessment of “potential competitors”? 
The notion of potential competitors is elaborated upon in the Danish Guidelines were the 
authorities held that when assessing whether the undertakings are potential competitors in a 
joint bidding scheme, the authorities “takes into account whether it is realistic that the 
undertakings will for example be able to expand their capacity to the one needed to be able to 
bid for the contract individually, even if they do not currently have the capacity to do so”.70 
Expanding of capacity must constitute a sustainable economic strategy, and will have to be 
assessed case by case. A theoretical possibility to carry out the contract alone is not sufficient, 
it must be realistic form the point of view of the undertakings.71  
 
The Danish Authority’s argument of sustainable economic strategy is logical when assessing 
joint ventures which allows for a broader approach when assessing the anti-competitiveness 
of the joint bid, but the relevance of the argument is not given when facing case by case 
collaborations.72 In these types of joint bidding the agreements between the undertakings are 
oriented towards the specific contract, making economic strategy less of a relevant 
consideration for the parties. This goes for short or medium length contracts in particular, 
since sustainability tends to be less of an issue.73  
 
In my opinion, it is important to bear in mind that the standard is the ability to tender 
individually.74 This means that there is no room for saying that it is a realistic possibility for 
subcontracting or expanding in other ways that bring the concept of an undertaking into 
question,75 and thus the undertakings must be considered as potential competitors. This must 
be the rule, even if the undertaking(s) by previous tender procedures have subcontracted. 
                                                 
70 Joint Bidding under Competition law - Guidelines published by the Danish Competition authority in 2018, 
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Such a broad understanding of the criteria underlines the fact that the undertakings were 
unable to submit an individual bid in the first place. Therefore, the assessment of 
counterfactuals must be strictly limited to realistic ways for the undertaking to expand 
themselves in order to comply with the selection criteria. The assessment is not based on 
ability to tender in other constellations than joint bidding, but ability to tender alone. 
 
Other views have been argued in academic circles.76 According to Thomas, the test is whether 
there could in fact have been two or more independent bids in the absence of the joint bid.77 
This is a broad test with a restrictive effect, where the undertakings in reality must assess all 
of their options to expand or supply their business before entering into a collaboration with 
another undertaking not able to meet the requirements.78 Such a test would also lead to the 
earlier mentioned issues with Art. 101(3) TFEU and Art.53(3) EEA,79 and thus cannot apply. 
By creating such an environment as the proposed test does, the undertakings´ freedom to plan 
their own business strategy is taken away by, in reality, denying them to explore consortia and 
ad-hoc collaborations.  
 
The case of El Proffen80 from the Norwegian Competition Authority might illustrate how far 
the assessment can go. The case was about a bid rigging consortia consisting of 5 
undertakings agreeing on submitting price fixed tenders for a framework agreement. Some of 
the parties to the bid-rigging consortia were not able to carry out the contract on their own, 
and because of this they took part in the collusion. The undertakings had the necessary 
technical competence, but were short on staff. The Norwegian Competition Authority 
emphasized that it was normal business practice81 to hire additional staff in order to comply 
with requirements in larger contracts. This was a minor adjustment, and included only a 
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limited financial risk. By hiring, the undertakings would be in a position to bid on their own. 
In addition, the undertakings being a part of the framework agreement did have the option to 
turn down projects if they did not have the capacity required.82 Because of this, the 
undertakings were considered to be potential competitors. 
 
I do not see any issues with applying the same views as put forth in El Proffen in a case of 
joint bidding. If looking to the selection criteria, the undertakings did comply with some of 
them, but not all. When assessing this in future cases, it is important to take into consideration 
how far off the undertakings are to fulfil the requirements, but also what type of 
requirement(s) the undertaking does not comply with. If the undertakings are short on staff, it 
must be taken into consideration how many workers the undertaking must expand with in 
order to comply with the criteria. And furthermore, if they have the necessary technical 
ability, this might play out differently than if they do not have the necessary equipment and 
they do not comply with the requirements on technical ability. If the undertakings are in a 
position where expansion includes a limited financial risk, and it is considered to be normal 
business practice to expand the business accordingly this might be enough to be considered as 
a realistic course of action.  
 
However, here is a thin line. The condition can be problematic to assess in the aftermath, as 
some things are easier to conclude on in hindsight. Also, it is difficult to justify a strict 
scrutiny of how the undertakings should have conducted their own business before deciding 
to enter into a joint bidding agreement. In my opinion, this goes especially for SMEs which 
generally do not have the same business structure and ability to adapt their capacity rapidly. 
The starting point to keep in mind should be that the undertakings are free to decide their own 
business strategy. With this approach the authorities will have to be aware of the 
circumstances the undertakings were basing its decision on at the moment. Great emphasis 
must be put on the realistic approach from the view of the particular undertakings, otherwise 
the rule would create a disincentive for joint bidding and leaving the legal incentive in 
Directive 2014/24 without effect.83 
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3.3 Joint bidding as a restriction by object 
3.3.1 The legal test to apply 
Agreements that have as their object the restriction or distortion of competition are 
characterized by the fact that they are harmful to competition by their very nature.84 It follows 
from the case law that in order to label an agreement as an object restriction the agreement has 
to reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition.85 To determine if a sufficient degree of 
harm is present regard must be had to the content of the agreements provision, its objectives 
and the economic and legal context.86 The intention of the parties may be taken into account, 
although subjective intentions are not necessary to establish restriction by object.87  
 
In Ski Follo the EFTA Court elaborated further on the legal test, saying that when looking 
into the context of the agreement, it is necessary to take into consideration the nature of the 
goods or services affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of 
the market(s) in question.88 An agreement must be capable of having at least some impact on 
the market. These statements are put forth by ECJ as well in a number of cases.89  
 
In addition, The EFTA Court held that “only conduct whose harmful nature is easily 
identifiable, in the light of experience and economics, should be regarded as a restriction of 
competition by object” with reference to the Opinion given by AG Wahl in CB.90 The easily 
identifiable test is not yet endorsed by EU Courts, and has no support in former case law. For 
that reason, the following assessment will not discuss this threshold or its application. 
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3.3.2 How to assess if joint bidding is a restriction by object? The 
content of the agreement 
It is evident from case law that the content of the agreement between the parties is of great 
importance to assess whether the joint bid constitutes a restriction by object. However, joint 
bidding agreements will vary in nature, with the possibility that some agreements in fact have 
such an anti-competitive nature revealed by its provisions that it stand out as a clear example 
of an object restriction.91 In Ski Follo the agreement had a clear anti-competitive object by 
expressly stating that the objective of the agreement was not only to reduce competition 
between the undertakings in general, but also to cooperate on pricing policy in tenders.92 The 
anti-competitive nature of the agreement was so prominent, making the subjective intentions 
of the parties a part of the evidence.93 Regardless of assessing a joint bid agreement or a joint 
venture agreement, the agreement itself is key. 
 
Also, what the agreement actually covers is of relevance. However, this has a side to the 
context of the agreement, due to the content being decided on the basis of what the 
procurement is about. This particular issue is discussed in section 3.3.4 after discussing the 
relevant context. 
 
In cases were the agreement itself does not reveal any intention of the parties, the context in 
which the joint bidding agreement functions will be even more important to assess. In the 
following I seek to clarify what indications might be found concerning the context of joint 
bidding agreements in public procurement tenders. 
3.3.3 The context of the joint bidding agreement  
One relevant aspect to assess is the tender documents, and the content of them. The tender 
documents unarguably are a part of the context, as to how the agreement between the parties 
should be interpreted. This might be of particular importance in case by case (ad-hoc) 
collaborations where there is no established consortia between the parties, as a result of the 
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assessment allowing for a much broader view in cases of consortia or joint ventures by 
looking at the collaboration between the parties in general. Also, the collaboration in these 
cases goes beyond the specific tender, giving the opportunity to consider if the collaboration 
goes beyond what was necessary to submit a joint tender. Thus, the documents will be a 
measuring point for the objective of the agreement by revealing what is necessary to agree 
upon. In a case by case collaboration one will have to limit the assessment to the situation for 
the specific tender. It is the tender documents that reveal the demand of the buyer, and thus 
being decisive for what the sellers have reasons to agree on.  
 
Furthermore, in the case of joint bidding there is a particular legal context. With joint bidding 
being not only allowed but also encouraged94 there is a legal incentive to engage in it. In 
addition, the procurement context imposes demands on potential sellers wanting to submit 
bids. In most cases, the procurement procedure is a competition on various criteria, including 
price. Thus, the undertakings submitting bids must not only comply with minimum 
requirements, but they must also set a price on their offer in order to access the market and 
thus the competition for the contract. This is a substantial difference in context from the 
normal market situation, where undertakings do not have the same reasons to collaborate and 
agree on prices. 
 
An additional factor concerning the agreement´s context, is if the number of competitors 
affects whether a joint bidding agreement can constitute an object restriction. The number of 
tenderers is a part of the context the bid is placed in. Logically, the more tenderers and bids 
the less restrictive a joint bid will be, because the buyer will have several options and there 
will be more competitive pressure. A joint bid will not cause a sufficient degree of harm to the 
competition. If there is heavy competitive pressure for the procurement, this might seem like 
an argument for not assessing whether the joint bid restricts competition by object in the first 
place but rather assess the actual effects of it. 
 
There are arguments going against such a view regarding the amount of tenderers. In his 
article, Ritter addresses this matter as follows. Firstly, even with high competitive pressure, a 
joint bid may still cause a sufficient degree of harm if the undertakings apply competitive 
                                                 
94 Chapter 2 
 
 
pressure on each other, or if they would be leading contenders had they bid independently.95 
Secondly, one of the aims with Art. 101 TFEU and Art. 53 EEA is to protect “competition as 
such”96, and those types of anti-competitive behaviour are prohibited as restrictions by 
object.97 Ritter further argues that the reasoning for this is administrability, effectiveness and 
the optimal use of presumptions. More in-depth investigations would improve accuracy, but it 
would be less effective.98  
 
A joint bid will always restrict the competition at some level if the parties are considered to be 
actual competitors. It is evident from the case law that the aim of Art. 101 TFEU is to protect 
competition in more general terms99 and this is one of the reasons why restriction by object is 
illegal. In the case of joint bidding, this would probably be decisive if the Courts have to rule 
on a case where the issue discussed is raised. Especially when seen in the light of the result in 
Expedia100, where it was made clear that even if the agreement found to restrict by object is of 
minor importance and do not have an appreciable effect, it is still prohibited.101  
 
There is no legal base for exempting agreements with minor importance in the general 
market, and I cannot see a legal base for exempting the procurement market from the result of 
Expedia. Thus, the result of Expedia must apply also in a procurement setting. The numbers 
of competitors are irrelevant when assessing whether the agreement has an anti-competitive 
objective. 
3.3.4 Joint bidding and joint selling – a closer look at the content of 
the agreement 
The issue of joint bidding has also been discussed by the Commission and national 
competition authorities with respect to joint selling.102 According to the Commission 
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Guidelines, joint selling and certain types of joint production agreements must be treated 
differently under Art. 101 TFEU. Agreements limited to joint selling generally have the 
object of coordinating pricing policy.103 However, the Guidelines provides no further 
explanation as to what joint selling is. In the chapter of production agreements the Guidelines 
exempt production agreements where the parties agree on the output, given that the other 
parameters of competition are not eliminated, or the agreement also entails joint distribution 
and price setting of those products if it is necessary for producing jointly in the first place, 
meaning that without the restriction the parties would not have incentive to produce jointly.104 
If either is the case, the agreement will not constitute an object restriction but it can be 
assessed under effect.105 The Guidelines are clear on the point that this applies to all forms of 
joint production agreements106, which includes agreements on joint bidding.  
 
The distinction between joint selling and joint production agreements is upheld by the Danish 
Competition Authority as well. In 2018 the Danish Competition Authority published new 
guidelines to joint bidding under competition law.107 The Guidelines have no relevance for 
determining EU and EEA competition law, but since the Danish regulation correspond to EU 
law, views and arguments put forth by the authorities in the guidelines might be subject to 
scrutiny under EU law as well. In the Guidelines, the authorities hold that collaboration 
agreements in procurement procedures “that in reality only covers joint selling – with joint 
bidding and joint price setting - typically restricts competition by object.”108 This might not be 
the case where the main function of the agreement is joint production. According to the 
guidelines, the authorities have to do an effect-assessment in the case of joint production 
being involved. 
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Ritter also draws a line between legitimate joint bidding and anti-competitive joint selling.109 
In his article, Ritter holds that joint tendering among competitors involves joint selling by 
definition, because the joint tender eliminates choice and competition between the 
undertakings on price, quality and value for money.110 
 
These statements put forth by both the Commission, the Danish Competition Authority and 
Ritter are difficult to interpret, and it is unclear what the legal basis for them is. Every 
procurement procedure involves a buyer and a seller. In the case of joint tendering, the sellers 
want to sell either goods, services or a production to the buyer. Thus, in every procedure there 
will be a joint bid and joint price setting. This cannot be decisive of joint bidding being an 
object restriction, as this type of assessment will be based on form and not function, which is 
the rationale behind the object restriction.111 The point is to figure out how a particular 
agreement can work in a specific context, in order to establish that it would restrict 
competition. Thus, the agreement together with its legal and economic context must be 
examined. When the Guidelines suggest that agreements which in reality only covers joint 
selling typically will be an object restriction, it is difficult to see what in reality is 
encompassed by that notion. It is clear that agreements consisting of production might not 
constitute an object restriction, so the statements viewed in the light of each other might 
suggest that the decisive point being what the procurement is about and what level of 
integration between the parties the agreement leads to. 
 
Such an interpretation is in line with case law from both EU Courts and the EFTA Court as 
well, where one must look not only to the context the agreement works in but first and 
foremost the content of the agreement.112 What have the parties agreed upon? If the joint 
bidders decide to sell a service or goods jointly, and they are able to do so without making 
any adjustments besides pooling what they are selling in order to deliver at the requested 
scale, then the agreement in reality will be two undertakings agreeing on the price to do so. 
The level of collaboration and integration between the parties is low.113 If the agreement 
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between the joint bidders requires them to integrate and collaborate on various levels, and 
perhaps take advantage of each other´s know how in order to deliver at the demands of the 
buyer, the agreement covers a lot more than just price setting. It will be an actual 
collaboration, where the center of gravity of the agreement is regulating the parties´ 
performances. The main object of the agreement will be what the parties are to do and 
regulation of how this should be done, not price setting or agreeing on other terms. The 
agreement could also be about pooling resources to potentially create an economy of scale 
which again will make the bid more competitive. This illustrates that what the agreement 
actually covers and what level of collaboration and integration the contract requires of the 
undertakings involved is a relevant factor in assessing whether the bid constitutes an object 
restriction or not. Agreements covering production, integration or adaptation may be 
complicated, and at some point the content of the agreement makes it necessary to examine its 
effect and not its object. It will be impossible to establish a restriction by object, due to the 
content of the agreement. The discussion above shows that it is not given that the joint bid 
constitutes a restriction by object.  
3.4 Is joint bidding price-fixing? 
If joint bidding is to be treated as price-fixing, this will mean that joint bidding is a hard core 
restriction of competition by object.114 This will have consequences for both the assessment of 
the bid and the agreement but also with regard to potential application of grounds of 
justification and exemptions. To answer the question raised, I will analyze the EFTA courts´ 
decision in Ski Follo,115 the only case for the court within EU/EEA regarding this question. 
3.4.1 Summary of the facts and conclusion by the Court 
In Ski Follo, two taxi companies submitted joint bids through a co-owned management 
company responsible for administrative functions in two different procurement procedures 
conducted by Oslo University Hospital. The hospital carried out the procedure for acquisition 
of transport services for its patients. The first procedure was terminated due to lack of 
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competitors, and in the second procedure Ski Follo submitted a new joint bid and was 
admitted to the framework agreement.  
The Norwegian Competition Authority initiated an investigation and later concluded that the 
joint bids had as their object the restriction of competition, and thus were in breach of § 10 of 
the Norwegian Competition Act, equivalent to Art. 53 EEA and Art. 101 TFEU. The decision 
was challenged for the court, with the following judgment being appealed all the way to the 
Supreme Court of Norway who then referred the matter to the EFTA Court for an Advisory 
Opinion. The EFTA Court held the joint bids to constitute an object restriction, as they were 
considered to constitute a form of price-fixing. 
3.4.2 Analysis of the Court´s decision 
In Ski Follo the EFTA Court took the position that the joint bids were to be considered as 
price-fixing because “by submitting joint bids the undertakings agreed on the price offered to 
the contracting authority”.116 Looking at the quote itself, this might indicate that joint bidding 
always constitutes price-fixing. Two or more undertakings coming together for bidding on a 
specific tender will necessarily include an element of price, except where the tender is price 
fixed, and the competition between compliant tenders meeting the minimum requirements 
will be based on quality.117 If so, joint bidding cannot constitute price-fixing since the 
agreement does not include an element of price.118 
 
Although the EFTA Court by the brief look of it seemed to be of the opinion that joint bidding 
is to be treated as price-fixing, it provided no arguments for its view, beside the fact that the 
undertakings had agreed on a price in order to tender for the contract. Yet and importantly, the 
Court did not speak on joint bidding in general, rather its opinion was given with the specific 
situation in mind. The question of whether joint bidding constitute price-fixing in general was 
not discussed.  
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The Opinion comes across as somewhat too easy at this point, given that the appellants did 
put forth some arguments on the matter which were not addressed by the Court.119 The 
approach might be explained by other circumstances around the facts of the case, which in 
reality left it easy for the Court to conclude with the agreement being labelled as price-fixing. 
The agreement between the undertakings included a clear statement, saying that collaboration 
would lead to less competition between the parties, and this applied also to their pricing 
policy in tenders.120 The parties had a clear anti-competitive intention, and they were able to 
complete the contract without any further integration or adaptation. It was also clear that the 
parties were able to bid individually, thus making them actual competitors for the contract. 
Looking at the facts of the case, it was a clear cut example of an anti-competitive behaviour 
and agreement. With the Court not being in doubt of the nature of the agreement, this can 
explain why the Court did not address some of the appellants argument on price-fixing. 
However, the Court could have been more transparent in its argumentation, if its decision to 
view it as price-fixing was due to the content of the agreement together with the price setting 
and not just the price setting in isolation. The decision of the Court should be taken into 
account as merely an example of when joint bidding can be assessed as price-fixing, but not 
that it should be. There is no case law from ECJ nor the General Court on this matter, leaving 
it a question yet to be answered with certainty. 
3.4.3 What are the potential consequences? 
After the EFTA Court in Ski Follo held that the submission of joint bids was price-fixing, the 
court added that  
in order to determine whether the submission of joint bids through a joint management 
company reveals a sufficient degree of harm [such] that it may be considered ta 
restriction of competition by object, regard must be had to the substance of the 
cooperation, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms part. 
The parties´ intention may also be taken into account, although this is not a necessary 
factor. Moreover, since the submission of joint bids involves price-fixing, which is 
expressly prohibited by Article 53(1) EEA, consideration of the economics and legal 
context may be limited to what is strictly necessary in order to establish the existence 
of a restriction of competition by object. However, such an assessment needs to take 
into account, albeit in an abridged manner whether the parties to an agreement are 
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actual or potential competitors and whether the joint setting of the price offered to the 
contracting authority constitutes an ancillary restraint.121 
 
With this statement, the EFTA Court takes the view that an agreement involving price-fixing 
does not have to undergo an as thorough assessment as any other agreement which might 
restrict competition by object. The starting point being that since the joint bid is price-fixing, 
the assessment of whether or not the agreement constitutes an object restriction may be 
adapted thereafter. It takes less to establish a restriction by object. This is in line with former 
case law from ECJ.122 
 
In the case of the agreement not involving any of the elements expressly listed in Art. 101(1) 
TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA, the assessment of its content and context is much more 
thorough123 This difference must be seen in light of earlier case law, where experience shows 
that certain types of conduct lead to fall in production and price increase, which again result 
in poor resource allocation to the detriment of consumers especially124 and, in the case of joint 
bidding: The public buyer. Such conducts include price-fixing agreements.125 
 
Therefore, the assessment of the economic and legal context in such a perspective with regard 
to joint bidding is limited to what is “strictly necessary” to establish a restriction by object.126 
However, given the distinction between price-fixing and price setting, and how undertakings 
are forced to set the price in order to have a possibility to enter the procurement market due to 
compliance with minimum requirements, it is unfortunate to establish a default of joint 
bidding being price-fixing in my opinion. By doing so, the burden of proof shifts on the 
parties almost from the very start, forcing them to provide evidence of the agreement leading 
to economic efficiencies as set out in Art. 101(3) TFEU. This situation might have a negative 
effect on the incentive to engage in joint bidding in the first place, because in reality, the 
undertakings will have no choice but to carefully assess the positive effects of a collaboration 
before deciding to enter into it. 
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Joint bidding being price-fixing will also affect the undertakings´ possibility to claim the joint 
price setting as an ancillary restraints, because it would create an illogical line of arguments. 
Ancillary restraints are restrictions of competition which are necessary to achieve a different 
commercial goal, where the main operation is not restricting competition.127 Thus, the result 
being that the agreement or the conduct/clause in the agreement fall outside Art. 101 TFEU or 
Art. 53 EEA altogether because of their nature as ancillary. For case by case collaborations, 
the joint bid is the agreement, and it would be illogical to state that the joint bid is price-fixing 
but then later consider the price-fixing ancillary. For established consortia this would be 
different, since there is a wider agreement behind the specific joint bid. The bid itself is not 
the agreement between the parties. If joint bidding is to be treated as price-fixing in general, it 
would be impossible for case by case collaborators to try and defend the bid under the rules 
on ancillary restraints. In contrast, in Ski Follo the EFTA Court did point out that an anti-
competitive restriction may escape the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA if 
the restriction can be regarded as ancillary to the main operation,128 but it is difficult to see 
how this would play out in practice in the case of joint bidding being price-fixing, and 
especially in case by case collaborations. The view held by the Court adds to the conclusion 
of the arguments put forth in the case regarding joint bidding being price-fixing were quite 
single minded, and thus not applicable to joint bidding in general. 
 
Moreover, the possibility to exempt the agreement under the rules on block exemptions for 
horizontal agreements will also be affected if joint bidding is to be treated as price-fixing. The 
block exemptions are not applicable to agreements containing hardcore restrictions such as 
price-fixing. 129 The same views applies to the De Minimis doctrine.130 The Danish 
Competition Authority indicate in its Guidelines that exempting joint bidding agreements 
under block exemptions might be a possibility131 but is not clear on how this would interact 
with the result in Ski Follo. The most obvious answer to this potential issue is that joint 
bidding cannot be regarded as price-fixing per se.  
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3.4.4 What is the status? Is joint bidding price-fixing? 
The obvious argument to consider joint bidding as price-fixing is that there is an element of 
price in the agreement between the undertakings collaborating on the tender, this was also 
emphasised by the EFTA Court.132 Furthermore, there are no specific rules in competition law 
to apply in joint bidding situations, meaning that there is a chance for joint bidding to be 
considered as price-fixing in theory.  
 
However, joint bidding agreement differs from normal price-fixing agreements and cartels, 
where undertakings choose to collude with the specific goal to fix the prices, manipulate and 
control the market they are already a part of. In a normal market situation the undertakings 
competing in the same segments of the market have no legitimate reason to agree on prices, 
and since this is considered harmful by its nature by ECJ it is not necessary to assess the 
agreement further to establish it as a price-fixing agreement. In a procurement setting, the 
undertakings in a vast majority of cases must set the price in order to comply with minimum 
requirements, which again gives opportunity to compete in the procurement market.133 From 
this point of view, there is no way around the price setting element for the parties to gain 
market access, in contrast to the normal market situation. This might indicate that when 
assessing if there is a breach of Art. 101(1) TFEU or Art. 53(1) EEA in a joint bidding 
situation, there cannot be put too much weight on the fact that the parties have agreed on the 
price in my opinion. The content and context of the agreement must be even more 
highlighted. 
 
Building on this argument, when looking at the matter from a broader perspective outside the 
case of Ski Follo, it is useful to highlight the issue more thoroughly. In the case before the 
Court, the submitted bids resulted from a joint venture. The agreement between the 
undertakings goes beyond the specific tender, providing a broader context to the assessment. 
There is already a level of collaboration between the parties, and by submitting a joint bid, 
this collaboration is taken even further. In case of ad-hoc collaborations, it is easier for the 
undertakings to adopt the level of collaboration actually needed for the specific tender. With 
the possibility of a joint bid being a result of different types and levels of collaborations and 
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agreements, this highlights even more the issue of treating joint bidding in a formalistic 
manner, and not having sufficient regard to the agreement between the parties.  
 
Does this mean that joint bidding can never be price-fixing, because the parties to the 
agreement are forced to agree on and set a price in order to submit a tender or request to 
participate? No, the conclusion is that joint bidding can constitute price-fixing in some cases, 
but this should only apply to clear cut cases, where the anti-competitive objective of the 
agreement is prominent.  
3.4.5 Closing comments on Ski Follo 
As already stated, the status after the Opinion given by the EFTA Court is that joint bidding 
can constitute price-fixing due to its price setting element, but not that it does in general. The 
problem with the Court´s line of argument is that it applies to joint bidding in general, 
because every joint bid involves a price agreed upon by the parties. In this perspective, the 
Court delivered a very broad statement which could prove problematic if accepted without a 
critical eye. With this in mind, it is even more important to keep in mind that the Opinion 
does not provide legal basis for saying that joint bidding always will constitute price-fixing. 
There is no general statement from the Court on this point, but with its argumentation, the 
Opinion has opened the door wide open for further development on this matter. For this 
reason, it is important to be aware of the particular circumstances in Ski Follo, as already 
stressed.  
Furthermore, joint bidding will take form of different types of agreements, with the possibility 
that the submission of a joint bid is a conduct rooted in a joint venture. This gives even more 
reason to base the assessment on the agreement between the parties and its context, and not 
the mere fact that the parties have set a price. Every agreement is different, and must be 
assessed individually in line with the general rules for object restrictions. If joint bidding is to 
be treated as price-fixing in general, this will undermine the purpose of the object restriction, 
which is to assess the agreement to figure out how it will function in and affect the relevant 
market it is a part of.  
 
 
4 Concluding remarks  
Over the last chapters I have discussed how joint bidding in public procurement can be 
reconciled with competition law and the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements. Although 
there are challenges as to how this reconciliation should work out, I have attempted to 
illustrate that there is and should be room for engaging in joint bidding - also under 
competition law, even if the case law points that these practices may qualify as object 
restrictions. These two set of rules can work together; yet it is paramount to interpret the 
existing rules to create a coherent system of law were the particularities of joint bidding and 
public procurement are not only respected but also taken seriously when assessing it from a 
competition perspective. How to achieve this is analyzed and discussed throughout my thesis. 
My main contribution with this thesis is that future application of competition law to the joint 
bidding scheme must be aware and take into consideration the potential “booby traps” this 
reconciliation holds. These traps I have identified are several; the discussion on potential 
competitors; the need of reconciliation with the possibility to defend the agreement under Art. 
101(3) TFEU and Art. 53(3) EEA; the question of whether joint bidding is price-fixing; and 
the possibility to defend the agreement as either an ancillary restraint or under block 
exemptions.  
Joint bidding is not one generic agreement. Joint bidding can group a variety of agreements 
with different content taking place in different contexts. Furthermore, the requirement of price 
setting in order to submit a bid to avoid being declared not compliant by the contracting 
authority must be taken into account when assessing this question. As I have discussed earlier, 
there is no doubt that a joint bidding agreement could be considered as price-fixing, but the 
argumentation leading to such a result must be based on an assessment of the content and 
context of the agreement and not the mere fact that the parties sat a price on their bid. This is 
the main problem I see with the EFTA Court´s Opinion in Ski Follo. In some cases, the 
assessment of the joint bid and the agreement between the parties will show that there is no 
restriction of competition by object – even if the joint bid is a way of fixing the price in an 





Such a take on the matter adopted in Ski Follo would be oversimplifying, by not paying due 
regard to the content and context of the specific agreement. With a formalistic view, we are 
left with a situation where undertakings wanting to bid jointly must assume that the 
collaboration is illegal, and it is up to them to prove the legality of the joint bid. This will not 
only undermine Art. 19(2) but also most likely have a substantial negative impact on the 
number of undertakings willing to risk engaging in joint bidding. This could potentially have 
a harmful effect on SMEs´ participation in the procurement market, especially if looking to 
the development of centralization. The result could be fewer competitors participating in the 
market. Thus, the irony is that the development could potentially end up being harmful to 
competition itself, while trying to protect it. For those reasons, both the EFTA Court and the 
EU Courts must take responsibility when assessing joint bidding cases in the future. The issue 
requires cautiousness and awareness. The EFTA Court has opened the door for this 
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